We study a real valued propositional logic with unbounded positive and negative truth values that we call R-valued logic. Such logic slightly extends continuous propositional logic which, in turn, builds on Lukasiewicz many-valued logic. After presenting the deduction machinery and the semantics of R-valued logic, we prove a completeness theorem for finite theories. Then we define unital and Archimedean theories, in accordance with the theory of Riesz spaces. In the unital setting, we prove the equivalence of consistency and satisfiability and an approximated completeness theorem similar to the one that holds for continuous propositional logic. Eventually, among unital theories, we characterize Archimedean theories as those for which strong completeness holds. We also point out that R-valued logic provides alternative calculi for Lukasiewicz and for propositional continuous logic.
Introduction
Many-valued logics date back to the very early development of mathematical logic. The real unit interval [0, 1] since has been a favorite set of truth values. Among [0, 1]-valued logics, Lukasiewicz logic occupies a predominant place (see e.g. [Háj98] , [Pan98] ). Initially motivated by philosophic considerations and scientific curiosity, Lukasiewicz logic has received considerable attention by philosophers and computer scientists working on fuzzy logics, approximate reasoning or other forms of nonclassical reasoning. On the algebraic side, the study of Lukasiewicz logic led to the notion of MV-algebra. C.C. Chang first showed that MV-algebras provide a complete semantics for Lukasiewicz logic. See [Cha58] , [Cha59] .
Continuous logic makes its first appearence in [BYU10] . Its propositional fragment extends Lukasiewicz logic. See, for instance, the overview in [BYP10] . In spite of appearing just an extension of Lukasiewicz logic, continuous logic has an independent origin and different motivations. Actually, it builds on a field of research, initiated in the 1980's by Henson and continued by a number of authors, on the model theory of so called metric structures. Roughly speaking, these are first order versions of higher order structures (like Banach spaces, Banach algebras, probability spaces, etc.) that arise in functional analysis or probability theory.
As the origin of continuous logic lies in model theory, issues like developing deduction systems and studying their completeness have been somewhat postponed. A completeness theorem for continuous predicate logic appears in [BYP10] . The authors make use of results from [BY] , where a completeness result for propositional continuous logic is derived from the corresponding result for Lukasiewicz logic.
Being [0, 1]-valued, continuous logic apparently deals with bounded structures only. Such limitation can be overcome by allowing many-sorted structures, but the manysorted approach suffers from some drawbacks (see [BY08] ). Those can only be avoided by passing to a genuine logic for unbounded structures: one such a logic has been introduced in [BY08] .
In this paper we develop a syntactic calculus for a real-valued propositional logic, that we just call R-valued logic. We introduce a suitable notion of theory and, under convenient assumptions on theories, we prove different formulations of completeness with respect to a semantics that we introduce in Section 2. To the best of our knowledge R-valued logics have not been investigated yet. Notice that the logic in [BY08] is [0, +∞)-valued. We believe that the propositional case is of its own interest. Moreover, it provides valuable insight in view of a possible predicate extension.
In Section 3 we introduce the syntactic calculus of R-valued logic, which turns out to be quite different from the one introduced in [BYP10] and [BY] . Having in mind the axiomatization of Riesz spaces, logical axioms turn out to be quite natural. As for deduction rules, we show that modus ponens alone does not suffice to get completeness. For this reason we have to introduce two additional rules. Then we prove a number of properties of our provability relation, including a form of cut-elimination.
It is standard terminology to say that, in a given logic, strong completeness holds for a set Σ of formulas if Σ ⊧ ϕ if and only if Σ ⊢ ϕ, for every formula ϕ. If the previous property holds for all (finite) Σ, one says that (finite) strong completeness holds for that logic. We recall that finite strong completeness holds for Lukasiewicz logic and for continuous propositional logic.
In Section 5 we prove finite strong completeness for R-valued logic. The proof is obtained by reducing finite strong completeness to a problem in convex analysis, whose solution is provided by suitable formulations of Farkas' lemma. At the end of Section 5 we also show that R-valued logic provides alternative calculi for Lukasiewicz and for continuous propositional logic.
Another weak formulation of completeness, namely the equivalence of consistency and satisfiability, holds for Lukasiewicz logic and for continuous propositional logic. We refer to the equivalence of consistency and satisfiability as to weak completeness. Continuous propositional logic also satisfies a further weak version formulation of completeness, a so called approximated completeness (see [BYP10] . We show that validity of corresponding results in R-valued logic is not granted without additional hypothesis, as not every consistent set of assumptions extends to a maximal consis-tent one.
In Section 6 we define the classes of unital and Archimedean theories. We show that weak and approximated completeness (in the sense of continuous logic) both hold for unital theories. Finally, among unital theories, we characterize Archimedean theories as those for which strong completeness holds.
Formulas, structures and theories
In this section we begin the description of R-valued logic.
A language, or signature, L a set of symbols which we call propositions, or proposition letters. The set of formulas is the least set containing propositional letters and closed under the connectives in the set {0, +, ∧} ∪ Q, where 0 is logical constant; rational numbers are unary connectives; +, ∧ are binary connectives.
We also consider an extension of logical symbols obtained by adding the logical constant 1. We shall refer to these two settings as to the basic and to the extended case respectively.
A theory is a binary relation on the set of formulas, namely a set of inequalities. We elaborate on this definition of theory in Remark 9 below.
If M is a model and ϕ M ≤ ψ M we write M ⊧ ϕ ≤ ψ and we say that ϕ ≤ 2ψ holds in M . If T is a theory, we define M ⊧ T and T ⊧ ϕ ≤ ψ in the usual way. We write M ⊧ 0 < ϕ if 0 < ϕ M . Finally, we write Th(M ) for the set of inequalities that hold in M .
We finish this section commenting on our choice of logical connectives. The presence of a unary connective for each element of Q is just a matter of convenience. Alternative meaningful choices are {−1} or {− 1 2 }. Together with addition, the former singleton yields a connective for each element of Z. The latter yields a connective for each element of the set D of dyadic rationals. With respect to to both choices, logical axioms for lattice modules do replace those for vector lattices that occur in our setting. Having in mind an extension to the predicate case, we opt for a complete (in the sense of [BYU10] ) set of connectives. In this regard, D and Q are equivalent choices.
Logical axioms and derivations
The following inequalities, where ϕ, ψ and ξ range over all formulas, are called logical axioms. We write ϕ = ψ to denote the theory {ϕ ≤ ψ, ψ ≤ ϕ}.
So an axiom expressing an equality (see below) actually stands for a pair of axioms. We also write ϕ ≤ ξ ≤ ψ to denote the theory {ϕ ≤ ξ, ξ ≤ ψ}. The reader can make sense by her-/him-self of some other minor notational abuses.
There are two axiom groups. The axioms from the first group are chosen having in mind the theory of vector spaces over Q:
The axioms from the second group are inspired by the theory of Riesz spaces:
In the extended case, we add the following axioms for every proposition letter P :
There are three inference rules that are listed below. In the sequel we shall provide some arguments in favour of their mutual independence and their non-replaceability with logical axioms, even though we are not primarily concerned with these issues.
(Transitivity or modus ponens)
The notion of derivation is the standard one in Hilbert systems. As customary, we write T ⊢ ϕ ≤ ψ if there exists a derivation of ϕ ≤ ψ from T . We write ⊢ mp for derivability from r1 only and ⊢ lin for derivability from rules r1 and r2 only.
The following is straightforward:
1 Proposition (Soundness) For every theory T and every formula ϕ, if
We shall prove in the sequel that the converse implication holds for finite theories and, under additional assumptions, for infinite theories as well.
The following proposition states some facts that we shall frequently use in the sequel. The first fact states invertibility of rule r1; the second one is a generalization of r3.
Proposition
The following hold for all formulas ϕ, ξ, ψ:
Proof. (Sketch)
Another application of r2 to axioms, together with r1, yields ϕ ≤ ψ.
Add ξ on both sides and apply a12.
A naïve formulation of the classical deduction theorem in R-valued logic would be the following: if T, ϑ ⊢ lin ψ then T ⊢ lin ϑ ≤ ψ. Unfortunately this does not hold. For it holds that 2Q ≤ P, Q ⊢ lin P , but 2Q ≤ P ⊢ lin Q ≤ P , by Proposition 1. This counterexample also appears in [BYP10] . Nevertheless a weaker form of the deduction theorem holds:
Proof. As 2⇒1 is trivial, we prove 1⇒2. We argue by induction on the length of a derivation of ϕ ≤ ψ from T, ϑ. If the length is 1, then either ϕ ≤ ψ is in T or it is an axiom, in which case we take r = 0, or ϕ ≤ ψ is syntactically equal to 0 ≤ ϑ, so the conclusion follows by taking r = 1.
If the last rule applied in the derivation is r1 then T, ϑ ⊢ lin ϕ ≤ ζ and T, ϑ ⊢ lin ζ ≤ ψ, for some formula ζ. By induction hypothesis, T ⊢ lin ϕ + r 1 ϑ ≤ ζ and T ⊢ lin ζ + r 2 ϑ ≤ ψ, for some r 1 , r 2 ∈ Q + . The conclusion follows by taking r = r 1 + r 2 .
If the last rule applied in the derivation is r2 then there exist ϕ ′ , ψ ′ , ξ and s ∈ Q + such that ϕ and ψ are sϕ ′ + ξ and sψ
′ , for some t ∈ Q + . So the conclusion follows by taking r = st.
The proof of the Linear Deduction Theorem can be easily adapted to prove a similar statement for ⊢ mp in place of ⊢ lin , also getting the stronger conclusion that r ∈ N. We exploit this fact to argue that ⊢ lin is indeed stronger that ⊢ mp . Notice that 2P ⊢ lin P . On the other hand, if it were that 2P ⊢ mp P then, by the Deduction Theorem for ⊢ mp , we would get ⊢ mp r2P ≤ P for some r ∈ N. But the latter is not a valid derivation.
We justify presence of rule r3 in a similar way. We notice that P ⊢ lin P ∧0. Otherwise, by the Linear Deduction Theorem, there would be r ∈ Q + such that ⊢ lin rP ≤ P ∧ 0. Then ⊧ rP ≤ P ∧ 0, which does not hold.
A cut-elimination result follows from the Linear Deduction Theorem.
4 Proposition (Linear cut-elimination) The following are equivalent:
Proof. As 1⇒2 is trivial, we prove 2⇒1. From 2 and the Linear Deduction Theorem we obtain
Assume r, s > 0, otherwise the conclusion is trivial. Then T ⊢ lin (r
The following are basic identities valid in Riesz spaces (see e.g. [AB85]) that can also be proved in R-valued logic. We include a proof sketch for convenience.
The following hold for all formulas ϕ, ψ:
The ≤ inequality in 1 now follows from 3 of Proposition 2. The opposite inequality can be proved in a similar way, by a14 and 4 of Proposition 2. From 2 and a12 we obtain ⊢ ϕ
Follows from 2 and a12 as
6 Proposition (Deduction Theorem) The following are equivalent:
Proof. By 4 of Proposition 5, we have ϑ ⊢ ϑ − = 0. So implication 2⇒1 is clear. To prove 1⇒2, assume 1 and argue by induction on the length of a derivation of ϕ ≤ ψ from T, ϑ. If the length is 1, then either ϕ ≤ ψ is in T or it is an axiom, in which case the conclusion holds by taking r = 0, or ϕ ≤ ψ syntactically coincide with 0 ≤ ϑ and all we need to prove is T ⊢ 0 − rϑ − ≤ ϑ for some r ∈ Q + . But this clearly holds by taking r = 1 because
If the last applied rule in the derivation is either r1 or r2, then proceed as in the proof of Proposition 3.
If the last applied rule is r3 then ϕ and ψ are of the form ϕ
By applying rule r3 we obtain T ⊢ (ϕ
The conclusion thus follows.
7 Proposition (Cut-elimination) The following are equivalent:
2. T, ϕ ⊢ ψ and T, −ϕ ⊢ ψ.
Proof. As 1⇒2 is trivial, we prove 2⇒1. Notice that ⊢ (−ϕ) − = ϕ + so, assuming 2, from the Deduction Theorem we get
for some r, s ∈ Q + . Hence, by 3 of Proposition 2,
The conclusion follows if we show that ⊢ rϕ
The general case follows by using axioms a13 and a8.
So far all the results apply to the basic case and to the extended one. This is not the case with the next result.
8 Proposition In the extended case, for every formula ϕ there is an integer n such that ⊢ −n ≤ ϕ ≤ n.
Proof. Follows from a15 by straightforward induction on formulas.
A consequence of the proposition above is that −1 ⊢ lin ϕ for every formula ϕ. Notice that there is no formula that plays the role of a contradiction in the basic case.
9 Remark In this remark, which is not relevant for the further technical developments, we motivate our definition of theory.
In the theory of Boolean algebras, there is a well-known correspondence between homomorphisms and filters (equivalently: ideals). We recall that a similar correspondence holds for Riesz spaces. If f ∶ E → L is a homorphism of Riesz spaces, then
[0] is a so called solid subspace of E and f factors through the quotient epimomorphism π ∶ E → E F , where E F is the quotient Riesz space of E with respect to F . More precisely, there exists a unique Riesz space monomorphism
It is also well-known that the quotient of the set formulas of classical propositional logic with respect to the relation of provable equivalence is a Boolean algebra and that deductively closed set of formulas become filters in such algebra (the improper filter corresponding to any inconsistent set).
Also, in R-valued logic, it can be easily verified that the quotient R ∼ of the set R of formulas of any fixed language with respect to the equivalence relation defined by ϕ ∼ ψ ⇔ ⊢ ϕ = ψ is a Riesz space, when equipped with the induced operations. So, in order to carry on with the similarities, one should define a theory in R-valued logic as a set T of formulas such that T ∼ is a solid subspace. Actually, our definition of theory as a set of inequalities is essentially equivalent to the above. For it is easy to verify that, if T is a theory in our sense, then the set {(ϕ ∼ , ψ ∼ ) ∶ T ⊢ ϕ ≤ ψ} is a preorder on R ∼ which 2. is compatible with the Riesz space structure (in the sense expressed by deduction rules r1 ÷ r3 above).
Moreover, if we replace R ∼ with an arbitrary Riesz space E and ⊑ is a preorder on E which satisfies 1 and 2 above, then the set F = {v ∈ E ∶ 0 ⊑ v ⊑ 0} is a solid subspace. Vice versa, if F is a solid subspace of E, by letting v ⊑ w ⇔ v ≤ w + c for some c ∈ F, we obtain a preorder that satisfies 1 and 2.
To sum up: the definition of theory is just a matter of taste. For us, a theory is essentially a partial ordering on the set of formulas, which can be interpreted by saying that some formula is always truer than some other formula, without reference to a notion of absolute truth. On the contrary, in the alternative setting presented above, the logical constant 0 represents absolute truth, just as in Continuous Logic, and a theory contains all the "absolutely true" formulas.
Linear formulas
We say that formula ϕ is linear combination of formulas ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n if it is of the form Basic case:
for some a 1 , . . . , a n , a ∈ Q, with the convention that, if n = 0, the two summations stand for 0 and a respectively. When a 1 , . . . , a n , a ∈ Q + we say that ϕ is a positive linear combination. We say that ϕ is a linear formula if it is a linear combination of pairwise distinct proposition letters. We call the corresponding tuple (a 1 , . . . , a n ) the vector associated to ϕ and a the affine component of ϕ.
Notice that each formula free from connective ∧ is ⊢ lin -equivalent to an essentially unique linear formula, which, with slight abuse, we may call its normal form. In the sequel we shall always assume that linear formulas are in normal form. For reader's convenience, we provide an affine version of Farkas' Lemma that is suitable for purposes, in the sense that it is formulated with respect to the field of rationals. See the comment at the beginning of [Sch00, Ch. 7] about its validity in the setting of rationals. See [Sch00, Corollary 7.1h] for a proof.
10 Lemma (Farkas' Lemma) Let v 1 , . . . , v n , u ∈ Q k and let r 1 , . . . , r n , s ∈ Q. Let
. . , n} be non-empty. Then the following are equivalent:
We also recall the following related result ( Proof. Implication 4⇒1 trivially holds in both cases, under the assumption that ψ is a positive linear combination of ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n . In the extended case, if −1 is a positive linear combination of ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , then ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ⊢ lin − 1 and, by the remark after Proposition 8, we get ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ⊢ lin ψ.
Implication 1⇒2 is trivial and 2⇒3 holds by soundness. Only 3⇒4 is left to prove. Let P 1 , . . . , P k be the proposition letters that occur in the formulas ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ψ. Let v 1 , . . . , v n , u ∈ Q k be the vectors associated to ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ψ and let r 1 , . . . , r n , s be their affine components (in the basic case assume these to be 0).
In order to simultaneously deal with both cases, in the extended case, without loss of generality we assume that the inequalities −1 ≤ P i ≤ 1, for i = 1, . . . , k, occur among ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n . So 3 implies that
Let S be as in Lemma 10. Assume assume first that S is non-empty (which is certainly true in the basic case). By Lemma 10 we get q 1 , . . . , q n , r ∈ Q + such that q 1 v 1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + q n v n = u and q 1 r 1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + q n r n + r = s.
It thus follows that ϕ is a positive linear combination of ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n .
Eventually, we consider the case when S is empty. By Lemma 11, there exist q 1 , . . . , q n ∈ Q + such that ⊢ lin q 1 ϕ 1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + q n ϕ n = −1, as claimed in 4.
Finite strong completeness
Before proving a strong completeness theorem for finite theories, we need a preliminary result.
Letφ = (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) be a tuple of formulas and let ε = (ε 1 , . . . , ε n ) ∈ {−1, 1} n . We write εφ for the tuple ε 1 ϕ 1 , . . . , ε n ϕ n .
13 Lemma For every formula ψ there exist a natural number n ψ and a tupleψ of linear formulas of length n ψ with the property that, for each ε ∈ {−1, 1} n ψ there exists a linear formula ψ ε for which
Proof. By induction on ψ. The only non-trivial case is when ψ is of the form ϕ ∧ ξ. Let us inductively assume the statement true for ϕ and ξ. Then, for all ε ∈ {−1, 1} nϕ and all δ ∈ {−1,
Letψ be the concatenation ofφ,ξ and (ϕ ε − ξ δ ) εδ . where the tuples εδ are lexicographically ordered. We denote by p(εδ) the position of εδ in such ordering.
Let n ψ = n ϕ + n ξ + 2 nϕ+n ξ . Notice that every σ ∈ {−1, 1} n ψ can be uniquely written as a concatenation εδρ, for some ε ∈ {−1, 1} nϕ , δ ∈ {−1, 1} n ξ and ρ ∈ {−1, 1} 2 nϕ +n ξ . For each such σ we let ψ σ = ξ δ if the p(εδ)-th coordinate of ρ is 1 and ψ σ = ϕ ε if the p(εδ)-th coordinate of ρ is −1. It is now straightforward to check that σψ ⊢ ψ = ψ σ .
14 Proposition Let ϕ be a formula. Then the following are equivalent:
Proof. Direction 1⇒2 is soundness. We prove 2⇒1. Let n ϕ ,φ and ϕ ε , for ε ∈ {−1, 1} nϕ , be as in the statement of Lemma 13. Then
By soundness we also have εφ ⊧ ϕ = ϕ ε . So, assuming ⊧ ϕ, we obtain that εφ ⊧ ϕ ε for every ε ∈ {−1, 1} n . From the finite strong completeness theorem for linear formulas, Proposition 12, we get εφ ⊢ lin ϕ ε . Hence εφ ⊢ ϕ follows from 3. Finally, we obtain 1 by repeatedly applying cut-elimination, Proposition 7.
15 Corollary (Finite strong completeness) Let ϕ be a formula and let T be a finite theory. Then the following are equivalent:
For infinite T the previous corollary may fail. Consider the theory T = {0 ≤ rQ ≤ P ∶ r ∈ Q + } in the language L = {P, Q}. Then T ⊧ −Q but T ⊢ − Q, otherwise we would have T 0 ⊢ −Q for some finite T 0 ⊆ T . But T 0 ⊧ − Q for any finite T 0 ⊆ T . We shall elaborate on this in the next section.
16 Remark Work with a countable language L. Then R-valued logic is decidable.
Actually, the set {ϕ ∶ ⊢ ϕ} is clearly recursively enumerable. Moreover, by the Completeness Theorem above we have that ⊢ ϕ if and only if there is some structure M such that ϕ M < 0. The latter holds if and only ϕ M < 0 for some M ∶ L → Q.
Let P 1 , . . . , P n be the propositional letter occurring in ϕ. Any effective enumeration of Q n induces an enumeration (M k ) k∈N of all rational valued assignments of values to P 1 , . . . , P n . The procedure that, at step k, computes ϕ M k yields recursive enumerability of {ϕ ∶ ⊢ ϕ}.
17 Remark Extended R-valued logic faithfully interprets Lukasiewicz logic. In order to see that, recall that the connectives ∸, ¬ form a complete set of connectives for Lukasiewicz logic and notice that they are definable in the extended logic. Moreover, the models of Lukasiewicz logic form an axiomatizable subclass of those of extended R-valued logic, as simply one has to impose the condition 0 ≤ P on every proposition letter P . From Corollary 15 we get that, for every formula ϕ(P 1 , . . . , P n ) in the language of Lukasiewicz logic, whose proposition letters are among those displayed,
where ⊢ L and ⊢ stand for provability in Lukasiewicz and in the extended R-valued logic respectively.
Similar considerations apply to continuous propositional logic, recalling that {∸, ¬, 1 2 } is a complete set of connectives for such logic.
Archimedean theories
As usual, we say that a theory T is satisfiable if there exists a structure M such that M ⊧ T . In the basic case satisfiability property is trivial, as every theory is satisfiable in the constant model 0. Hence, in the basic case, we are actually interested in satisfiability other than in the constant model 0.
We say that T is consistent if T ⊢ ϕ for some formula ϕ.
We say that T is complete if it is consistent and, for every formula ϕ, T ⊢ ϕ or T ⊢ −ϕ, possibly both. In other words T is complete if its deductive closure is a non-trivial linear preordering on the set of formulas. The reader may verify that T is complete if and only if it is prime, namely if and only if it satisfies the property that whenever T ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ then T ⊢ ϕ or T ⊢ ψ.
Proposition Every consistent theory extends to a complete theory.
Proof. Let ξ be a formula such that such that T ⊢ ξ. Then T extends to a theory T ′ that is maximal with respect to the property that T ′ ⊢ ξ. Proposition 7 implies that T ′ is complete.
We say that T is unital if there is a formula ξ such that, for every ϕ, there is an r ∈ Q + such that T ⊢ ϕ ≤ rξ. Such a formula ξ is called a unit in T . In the extended case, constant 1 is a unit in all theories, as a consequence of Proposition 8.
Notice that if ξ is a unit in T , then ξ is such in every extension of T .
19 Remark It is straightforward to check that, if ξ is a unit in T , then T is consistent if and only if T ⊢ − ξ. Moreover, if T is maximal with respect to the latter property, then T is maximal consistent. Therefore unital consistent theories extend to maximal consistent theories. We shall see this is not true in general.
20 Remark Let T be a theory and let ϕ be a formula such that T ⊢ ϕ. Then, by Proposition 7, T, −ϕ is consistent. We shall repeatedly use this this fact in the sequel without further mention.
By the previous remark, every maximal consistent theory is complete. In the extended case, Th(M ) is trivially complete for every model M . The same holds in the basic case, when M is not the constant model 0. By Proposition 22 below, Th(M ) is also maximal consistent.
We write T + for the set of formulas ϕ such that T ⊢ ϕ and T − for the set of formulas ϕ such that T ⊢ −ϕ. If T + = T − we say that T is trivial. So, if T is non-trivial then T + ∖ T − is non-empty. Non-trivial theories are consistent: just notice that if
The converse is not true in general, the empty theory being a counter-example. Complete theories are easily seen to be non-trivial. Consistent unital theories are non-trivial as well.
We write Q + ϕ for the set {rϕ ∶ r ∈ Q + }.
21 Proposition Let T be a consistent theory and let ϕ, ψ be such that
Proof. If T, −ϕ is inconsistent then T, −ϕ ⊢ −ψ. By assumption and by the Deduction Theorem, we get T ⊢ Q + ϕ ≤ rϕ + , for some r ∈ Q + . From inconsistency of T, −ϕ we also get T ⊢ ϕ hence T ⊢ ϕ = ϕ + . Therefore T ⊢ −ϕ, contradicting the consistency of T .
We say that T is Archimedean if for every ϕ, ψ such that 
Proof. Implication 1⇒2 is straightforward. As for 2⇒3, assume 2 and, for sake of contradiction, let ξ ∈ T + ∖ T − which is not a unit. Then there is a formula ϕ such that T ⊢ ϕ ≤ rξ for any r ∈ Q + . Being complete, T ⊢ rξ ≤ ϕ for all r ∈ Q + . Hence, by the Archimedean property, T ⊢ −ξ, a contradiction.
As for 3⇒1, assume 3 and let ξ ∉ T . Completeness and closure under deduction yield that −ξ ∈ T . Hence, by assumption, −ξ is a unit in T . Therefore for every ϕ there exists r ∈ Q + such that T ⊢ rξ ≤ −ϕ. So T, ξ is inconsistent.
23 Example There is a complete theory T that has no maximal consistent extension.
In particular, T is non-Archimedean, non-unital, and has only the constant model 0.
For constructing such a theory T we introduce a generalized notion of structure. Let R be an arbitrary Riesz space. A generalized R-valued structure M is defined as in Section 2, with R replaced by R. It is easy to verify that the corresponding semantics is sound for R-valued logic. We are going to define a Q[x]-valued structure M . Recall that Q[x] has an ordered ring structure with respect to the order induced by r < x, for all r ∈ Q. For each i ∈ ω, the signature of M contains a proposition P i which is interpreted as the polynomial x i . Let T be the set of inequalities that hold in M . As the generalized semantics is sound, the theory T is consistent and deductively closed. As the ordering on Q[x] is linear, T is complete. Moreover
for all i so, if S is any Archimedean extension of T , then S ⊧ P i = 0. It follows that S is inconsistent. We have just shown that T has no consistent Archimedean extension, so it has only the constant model 0.
A word of comment on the generalized semantics above: just notice that every inequality (in our sense) can be regarded as an inequality in the language of Riesz spaces (metavariables for formulas becoming variables for vectors). Keeping this in mind, the axioms of R-valued logic are true in every Riesz space and its deduction rules can be regarded as valid deduction rules in the Riesz space setting. So, if N is any Riesz space and V ⊆ N is a set of linearly independent vectors, any set T of weak inequalities satisfied in N by linear combinations of elements of V ∪ {0} can be viewed as a consistent theory in our sense, simply by regarding each v ∈ V as a propositional letter. In particular, when N is linearly ordered, the set T of all inequalities satisfied in N by linear combinations of elements of V ∪ {0}, we get a complete theory.
24 Proposition (Weak completeness for unital theories) Let T be a consistent unital theory and let ξ be a unit in T . In the extended case further assume that ξ is 1. Then the following are equivalent:
1. T is consistent;
2. there exists a structure M such that M ⊧ T and ξ M = 1.
Proof. Implication 2⇒1 follows immediately from soundness. To prove 1⇒2, let S be 2. for every formula ϕ, if T ⊧ ϕ then T ⊢ ϕ.
Moreover 2⇒1 also holds for non-unital theories.
Proof. To prove 2⇒1, assume 2 and suppose that T ⊢ Q + ϕ ≤ ψ and T ⊢ − ϕ, for some ϕ, ψ. By 2, there exists M ⊧ T such that ϕ M > 0, which immediately yields a contradiction.
To prove 1⇒2, suppose that T is Archimedean. Let ϕ be such that T ⊢ − ϕ and let ξ be a unit in T . In the extended case further assume that ξ is 1. Let r ∈ Q + be such that T ⊢ rϕ ≤ ξ. Then T, ξ ≤ rϕ is unital and consistent. By Proposition 24 there exists M ⊧ T, ξ ≤ rϕ such that ξ M = 1. From M ⊧ r −1 ξ ≤ ϕ we get T ⊧ −ϕ.
An approximated completeness theorem, similar to that proved in [BY08] for continuous logic, holds for unital theories. It is an immediate corollary of Proposition 24.
26 Corollary (Approximated completeness for unital theories) Let T be a consistent unital theory. Then the following are equivalent:
1. T ⊢ ϕ + rξ for all 0 < r ∈ Q;
2. T ⊧ ϕ.
Proof. Implication 1⇒2 follows from soundness. To prove 2⇒1, let ξ be a unit in T .
In the extended case further assume that ξ is 1. Assume that T ⊢ ϕ + rξ, for some 0 < r ∈ Q. Hence T, −(ϕ + rξ) is consistent and unital. By Proposition 24, there exists M ⊧ T such that M ⊧ ϕ + rξ ≤ 0 and ξ M = 1. Such M witnesses T ⊧ ϕ.
